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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------
SHARON M. DAVIS, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES FRANCIS DAVIS, 
Defendant - Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. D-79-2691 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent sued Appellant for a Divorce, alimony, and. 
division of the property of the parties. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor, without a Jury on May 15, 1981. The Court granted a 
Decree of Divorce to the Respondent, awarded her $420.00 per 
month alimony, and distributed the property between the parties. 
The Appellant objected to the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. On September 1, 1981, 
the Court heard argument and modified the Decree of Divorce. The 
Decree, Order of Appellant's Objections, Conclusions of Law, 
Findings of Fact, and Order were signed September 29, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order remanding the matter for 
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further testimony, or modification of the Decree of Divorce upon 
the grounds that the Trial Court abused its discretion by 
awarding alimony, inequitably dividing the real property of the 
parties, and requiring the Appellant to wait an unreasonable 
length of time for his share of the equity in the residence, and 
compelling Appellant to sell his New Mexico land and give 
Respondent one-third of the proceeds, and ordering Appellant to 
pay $1,000.00 of Respondent's attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on March 4th, 
1974 in Evantson, Wyoming. No children were born of the 
marriage. However, three minor children of the Plaintiff born of 
a previous marriage lived with the parties. The Defendant pro-
vided the principal support for the Plaintiff and her minor 
children until May 15th, 1980, the date of separation. (Tr 44, 
lines 25-30) 
Prior to the marriage, Defendant purchased fbur, one-
half acre lots in New Mexico under a Real Estate Contract dated 
June, 1967, for $6,200.00. (Tr 53, lines 6~27) A substantial 
portion of the balance was paid prior to the marriage in 1974. 
After the marriage, the Defendant continued making all of the 
remaining payments from his income. Between the years 1974 and 
1978, during which time the contract was paid in full, the 
Plaintiff had no gainful employment. (Tr 53, lines 22-30) 
Therefore, the Plaintiff in no way contributed toward the 
_acquisition of the New Mexico property. 
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Prior to the marriage, the Plaintiff had acquired an 
interest in the residence in which the Plaintiff .and Defendant 
resided. The original purchase price of that property under a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract executed by the Plaintiff and her 
prior husband was $18,900.00. At the time of the marriage in 
1974, the first mortgage against the res~dence was $18,210.00. 
(Tr 10, lines 3-6) The Plaintiff, therefore, had an equity 
of approximately $3,000.00 in the residence which was valued at 
$21,000.00.' This particular $3,000.00 equity was confirmed by 
the fact that shortly after the Plaintiff and Defendant were 
married, Plaintiff suggested that the Defendant pay off her prior 
husband's lien against the property of $1,300.00 (Tr 5, lines 
19-29) The Defendant did, in fact, pay off the former husband's 
equity with a cash payment of $1,300.00. (Tr 33, lines 5-15) At 
that time, a deed was executed placing the property in the name 
of the Plaintiff and Defendant as joint tenants with full rights 
of survivorship. Shortly after the marriage, the Defendant com-
menced to substantially improve the residence by remodelling the 
house and purchasing new furnishings. In six and one-half years 
of marriage, the Defendant expended approximately $40,000.00 as 
follows: 
1. Second mortgage with Commercial Security Bank 
($15,000.00 principal, $5,708.00 interest) (Tr 25, lines 16-30) 
2. Personal injury settlement in 1973 for $8,500.00 
(Tr 84, lines 8-16) 
3. Inheritance fro~ mother's estate was $5,000.00 (Tr 
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84, lines 23-25) 
4. Personal injury settlement in 1978 for $7,000.00 
(Tr 84, lines 17-22) 
At the time of the separation in May of 1980, the residence was 
appraised by Defendant's appraiser at $78,000.00 and by the 
Plaintiff's appraiser at $61,500.00 •. (Tr 7, line 9) 
The house was inadequate and bare when Defendant moved 
in. (Tr page 86, lines 25-30) 
The Court ordered the Defendant to sell the New Mexico 
property and give Plaintiff one-third of the proceeds. The 
Defendant was awarded only $11,500.00 of the equity in the resi-
dence at the time of the divorce, together with one-halr of any 
future appreciation until Plaintiff remarries, cohabits, sells, 
or her youngest child attains the age of majority. It is evident 
that the Appellant is receiving substantially less than one-half 
of the equity in the house. The original value of the home was 
$18,900.00 and by using the Plaint~ff's appraisal of $61,500.00 
at the time of the Divorce, the equity would be $42,600.00. 
Therefore, Appellant should have been awarded a minimum of 
$21,300.00 plus any appreciation. 
The Plaintiff was awarded most of the personal property, 
including the furnishings. The Defendant was ordered to pay 
$420.00 per month alimony ($345.00 on the second mortgage 
payments and $rf5.00 addit·ional alimony) until the second mortgage 
of approximately $16,ooo.oo is paid in full. The monthly 
payments of the second mortgage are $345. 00. Defc~1dant is . lot to 
-4-
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participate in any equity created by the payment of alimony which 
is earmarked for payment on the second mortgage. 
The Plaintiff was -0rdered to pay approximately $1,200.00 
in indebtedness and the Defendant was ordered to pay approxi-
matley $9,000.00. in indebtedness, together with $1,000.00 towards 
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING ALIMONY AS PART OF MORTGAGE PAYMENTS 
IN WHICH APPELLANT WILL NOT PARTICIPATE WHEN 
THE PROPERTY IS SOLD. 
At the time the parties w~re married, the Respondent 
still had three minor children residing with her. The Appellant 
supported them as well as the Respondent. The parties lived 
together for approximately six (6) years during which time the 
Respondent was not employed. The substantial support of the 
family was derived from the Appellants income. 
During the course of the marriage, the Appellant not 
only paid off the Respondent's former husband's equity in the 
house, he purchased new furnishings and fixtures. The parties 
jointly borrowed $20,000.00 to remodel the residence. This loan 
was secured by a second mortgage against the residence payable at 
$345.00 per month. To assist the remodelling and refurnishing, 
the Defendant further expended $5,000.00 received from his 
mother's estate and $15,500.00 insurance proceeds realized from 
Defendant's personal injuries. 
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The additions to the residence greatly enhanced the com-
fort of the residence and increased its value. The second 
mortgage was being paid by the Appellant prior to their separa-
tion. 
As part of the Decree of Divorce, the Court ordered the 
Appellant to pay alimony in the sum of $420.00 per month until 
the second mortgage was paid in full. The $420.00 was broken 
down as follows: $75.00 cash and $345.00 payment on the second 
mortgage. 
This alimony payment in and of itself may not appear to 
be onerousj and it certainly provides financial assistance to the 
Respondent who may be in need of economic help for a short time. 
However, the Court, by not providing for the Appellant to recover 
at least to the extent of 50%. of the principal payments toward 
the second mortgage, was an abuse of discretion. The Respondent 
not only benefits from the immediate financial assistance, she 
also gets all of the equity derived from the mortgage payments 
made by the Appellant when the residence is sold. Surely, the 
$75.00 per month is more than ample alimony to be paid by the 
Appellant in light of the short number of years they were married 
and the financial· benefits Respondent and her children received 
during the marriage period. 
The Court held in Jesperson vs. Jesperson, (1980) 610 
P2d 326 at page 328 as follows: 
"We have previously held that a trial court must con-
sider many factors in making a property settle~e~t in a 
divorce proceeding, but that the purpose of the settle-
-6-
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page 872: 
ment should not impose punishment on either party .•• 
. . . " 
"In making a property division, a Court may properly 
consider such things as the length of the marriage and 
parties respective contributions to the marriage. This 
marriage lasted less than six (6) years and no children 
issued therefrom." 
In Read vs. Read, (1979) 594 2d 871, the Court said at 
"If it appears that the Decree is so discordant with an 
equitable allocation that it will more likely lead to 
further difficulties and distress than to serve the 
desired objective, then a reappraisal of the Decree must 
be undertaken." 
It is obvious that resentment develops when alimony is 
granted to one of the parties when the marriage has been of short 
duration and no issue was born of the marriage. It is therefore, 
understandable that the Appellant would be extremely unhappy at 
the prospects of not only paying substantial alimony in the form 
of mortgage payments when he is not even allowed to recover one 
red cent when the property is sold many years later. It has the 
effect of really paying the other spouse twice - once by 
relieving the spouse of making the mortgage payment, and then 
allowing the same spouse to get the "built up equity" when the 
house is sold. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GIVING 
THE RESPONDENT AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF THE EQUITY 
IN THE RESIDENCE AND COMPELLING THE APPELLANT TO 
SELL HIS NEW MEXICO PROPERTY IN WHICH HE MADE ALL 
. THE Pf\ YMENTS. 
Both of the parties had prior marriage~. The Appellant 
-7-
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was older and was supporting three minor children of his prior 
marriage as well as the Respondent's minor children. At the time 
of the marriage, he had been paying on some vacant lots in New 
Mexico for approximately six (6) years. After the marriage, from 
his earnings he made the remaining payments on the real estate 
contract. 
The Respondent brought into the marriage three minor 
children and a residence. From the prior divorce, the equity in 
their property was determined to be approximately Three Thousand 
Dollars ($3,000.00). The former husband was awarded a $1,300.00 
lien on their residence. The Respondent asked the Appellant to 
pay off her former husband's equity, which he did. Thereafter, 
the Respondent executed a new Deed making each of the parties 
joint tenants. It appears.that the intent was to thereafter 
recognize each other as equal owners. 
The Respondent did not have any gainful employment. 
The result was that the first and second mortgage payments as 
well as the family food, clothing, and other necessities were 
provided by the Appellant. At the time of the marriage, the 
first mortgage was approximately ($18,210.00). At the time of 
the Divorce, the value of the residence was between $61,500.00 
and $78,ooo.oo depending on which appraisal is used. The first 
($14,421.90) and second ($15,876.26) mortgages would total 
approximately $30,298.16. Therefore, the equity would be between 
$31,000.00 and $48,000.00, all of which equ"ity has been acquired 
during the marriage. Appellant paid for the entire equity by way 
. of mortgage payments and the purchase of the former husband's 
-8-
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interest. In addition, the Appellant must pay off the entire 
second mortgage by which time the Respondent's youngest child 
will be approaching eighteen years of age, at which time the 
equity will have been increased $15,876.26. Under the cir-
cumstances why is it not reasonable for the Appellant to expect 
one-half of the entire equity which he has substantially created 
rather than the minimal $11,500.00 plus one-half of the increase 
due from inflation? In all fairness, it would appear that the 
Appellant should be entitled to $11,500.00 plus the return of the 
second mortgage payments and one-half of the equity realized by 
inflation. The Respondent at most should receive one-half of the 
total equity, none of which was acquired by any financial contri-
bution on her part. As an additional benefit, she will have 
realized the use and possession of the residence until the resi-
dence is sold pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. 
The Appellant has not only received an unfair distribu-
tive share of the residence, the Court has ordered him to sell 
the New Mexico land which he purchased six (6) years prior to the 
marriage and made every payment subsequent to the marriage. Why 
should the Respondent receive any interest in the out of state 
property when she has made no contribution for it acquisition? 
Certainly the $75.00 per month alimony should fully compensate 
her for any loss she may have suffered as a result of the 
marriage and divorce. 
This particular type of inequitable distribution was met 
by the Court in the case of Read vs. Read (1979) 594 P2d 871 at 
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page 872, the Court said: 
" It is well established that the Trial Court has 
considerable discretion in the allocation of the pro-
perty and financial resources of the parties. 
Nevertheless, this discretion is not entirely without 
1 imi t. • • . . " 
" When a marriage has failed, a Court's duty is to 
consider the various factors relating to the situation 
and to arrange the best allocation of the property and 
the economic resources of the parties so that the par-
ties and their children can pursue their lives in as 
happy and useful manner as possible. In view of these 
principles, it is our view that the property award in 
this case is too desparate and that the Decree must be 
modified. In light of this conclusion, and because the 
case is equitable in nature, this Court may either exer-
cise its own preragative of making a modification in the 
Decree or remand for entry of a modified Decree by the 
Trial Court." 
The Court also considered the consequences of the sale 
of real property when it could be a severe disadvantage to the 
other property. In Berry vs. Berry (1981) N. 17165 Filed July 
30, 1981, the Court states at page 36 of the State of Utah 
Bulletin Number 81-14, August 15, 1981: 
" Because of his financial condition, we find that 
this was an abuse of discretion. The Order requiring 
the Defendant to purchase her interest is unfairly 
weighted in her favor and creates a burden upon him 
which he should not be expected to bear at this time 
under the present circurrstances.n 
In the instant case, the Appellant is ordered to sell 
the lots purchased by the Appellant and give Respondent one-third 
of the net proceeds. Why should the Appellant be ordered to sell 
this property in a destressed market in order to satisfy this 
one-third unearned interest? The Court itself admitted, after 
hearing oral argument on September 1, 1981, that he had no way of 
-10-
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knowing its value. The Trial Court said, 
"With regard to the ranch property, I struggled with . 
that for quite a while and can find no other way to find 
out the true market value of that property than to sell 
it and divide the proceeds." (Tr 19, lines 15-18) 
The inequity of the property distribution becomes more 
obvious when considering that the Respondent received virtually 
all of the furniture and furnishings acquired by the parties, the 
Respondent was ordered to pay some $1,200.00 in debts, the 
Appellant was ordered to pay $9,000.00 in debts and $1,000.00 
toward Respondent's attorneys fees. 
It may be argued that Appellant did get to keep his 
Retirement account, but under the circumstances, it would appear 
that the Respondent has done nothing to deserve any share in it. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has not received an equitable share in the 
distribution of the property of the parties. The Trial Court 
abused its discretion in not providing that the Appellant recover 
at least one-half of the monies which he has and will invest in 
the property prior to its sale together with one-half of the 
appreciation. The Trial Court further abused its discretion in 
awarding the Respondent a one-third interest in the New Mexico 
property when it was purchased by the Appellant prior to the 
marriage, and she made no payments subsequent to the marriage. 
This unfairness is multiplied by the Decree ordering that the 
property be sold in order to determine its m~rket value. 
Appellant respectfully requests.this Court to modify the 
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Decree of Divorce in accord with fairness or in the alternative, 
remand the case for further hearing. 
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this _!f_ __ day of January, 1982. 
-12-
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCEN~ 
Henr'y S. Nygaard 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Charles Francis Davis 
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